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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

DALE J. BAIRD,
Petitioner/Appellant,
Case No. 20020435-CA
v.
HANK GALETKA,
Respondent/Appellee.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Petitioner appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. His
petition challenged his convictions for sexual abuse of a child, a second degree felony,
dealing in harmful material to a minor, a third degree felony, and unlawful supply of
alcohol to a minor, a class A misdemeanor. R. 1-2,23-25. This Court has jurisdiction
pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 2001).
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1. Did the post-conviction court correctly find that the petition was barred by the
one-year statute of limitations governing petitions for post-conviction relief and that the
interests of justice did not excuse petitioner's late filing?

Standard of Review: This Court reviews "an appeal from an order dismissing or
denying a petition for post-conviction relief for correctness without deference to the lower
court's conclusions of law." Rudolph v. Galetka, 2002 UT 7, U 4, 43 P.3d 467.
2. Is the statute of limitations in the Post-Conviction Remedies Act, UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-3 5a-107 (1996), an unconstitutional suspension of the writ of habeas corpus?
Standard of Review: Defendant did not raise this issue below. '"[I]ssues not
raised at trial cannot be argued for the first time on appeal... unless the petitioner
demonstrates that 'plain error' occurred or 'exceptional circumstances' exist.'" State v.
Calliham, 2002 UT 86, U 70,455 Utah Adv. Rep. 25 (quoting Monson v. Carver, 928
P.2d 1017, 1022 (Utah 1996) (additional citations omitted).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Resolution of this case involves interpretation of the following provisions, whose
text is reproduced in addendum A:
U.S. CONST, art. I, § 9;
UTAH CONST, art. I, § 5;
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-35a-107 (1996).
CASE AND FACT STATEMENT
The Crimes

On 20 October 1996 petitioner invited eleven-year-old D.D. to his hotel
room/apartment. R. 131. Petitioner provided D.D. with alcohol and allowed him to look
at pornographic magazines. R. 131, 140, 141-146. Petitioner inserted his penis into
D.D/s rectum, and D.D. inserted his penis into petitioner's rectum. R. 131. Based upon
2

this conduct the State charged petitioner with two counts of sodomy upon a child, both
first degree felonies, and one count each of dealing in harmfiil material to a minor, a third
degree felony, and supplying alcoholic beverages to a minor, a class A misdemeanor. R.
130-31.
Sodomy upon a child is punishable by a minimum-mandatory term of six, ten, or
fifteen years-to-life. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-403.1 (1999). Imprisonment is mandatory.
Id
The Plea Agreement
Robin K. Ljungberg of the Salt Lake Legal Defender's office represented
petitioner. R. 136. Mr. Ljungberg negotiated a plea agreement on petitioner's behalf in
which the State agreed to drop the two counts of sodomy upon a child and instead charge
petitioner with one count of sexual abuse of a child, a second degree felony. R. 137, 153.
The agreement also required petitioner to plead to the third degree felony charge of
dealing in harmfiil material to a minor, and the class A misdemeanor charge of supplying
alcoholic beverages to a minor. Id. Petitioner accepted this agreement. Id. The State
filed an amended information reflecting the changes. R. 163-64.
Judge Atherton accepted petitioner's guilty plea on 6 January 1997. R. 137, 161.
She found that petitioner's pleas were entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.
R. 150, 161. Petitioner did not file a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas.
Sentencing
On 3 March 1997 the trial court sentenced petitioner to serve one-to-fifteen years
on count one, sexual abuse of a child, zero-to-five years on count two, dealing in harmfiil
3

material to a minor, and twelve months on count three, supply of alcohol to a minor. R.
171-73. The sentences for counts one and two were to run consecutively to each other,
but concurrent with the sentence for count three. Id. Petitioner did not file a notice of
appeal.
The Post-Conviction Petition
On 17 April 2001 petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief.1 R. 1-14, a
copy of the petition is contained in Addendum B. He alleged that his counsel provided
ineffective assistance by:
1) representing the interests of the State;
2) failing to investigate and interview alibi witnesses;
3) misleading petitioner to believe that he would be found guilty given his
prior conviction on similar charges;
4) misleading petitioner to believe that the examining physician's report
contained damaging information;
5) misleading petitioner to believe that the State would admit that its
version of the allegations were wrong and would accept his version of
the facts, and that the official version of the offense in the pre-sentence
investigation report (PSI) would not be considered by the sentencing
court, by Adult Probation and Parole in making their recommendation to
the sentencing court, or by the Board of Pardons;
6) refusing to allow petitioner to review the entire contents of his plea affidavit;
and

1

Petitioner claims he filed his petition on 25 January 2001. Br. of Pet. at 7.
While the docket reflects that a petition was "filed" on 25 January 2001, petitioner did not
pay the filing fee until 17 April 2001. See Docket for case number 010900810, attached
to right-hand side of the pleadings file. As explained below, even if the petition was
"filed" on 25 January 2001 it was still untimely.
4

7) failing to correct two errors in the PSI.
R. 8-10, Add. B.
In response, the State argued that the claims were time barred under the PostConviction Remedies Act, UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-35a-i07 (1996). R. 108-19. The State
also argued in the alternative that petitioner waived some of his claims and that his
remaining claims were meritless because he could not establish that, but for his counsel's
alleged ineffectiveness, he would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going
to trial. R. 119-26.
Petitioner argued in reply that he did not learn he could file a petition for postconviction relief until fourteen months after his sentencing. R. 198. He also explained
that he requested a copy of his file from his attorney on 11 May 1998, but did not receive
it until 25 October 1999. Id. Finally, he stated that his claims were not apparent to him at
sentencing because it was not until he received his counsel's file that he learned his
counsel allegedly had not investigated the case. R. 198-99.
On 11 April 2002 the court held a hearing on the petition and heard arguments
from petitioner and counsel for the State. R. 204,217. The court dismissed the petition
as time-barred. R. 217-20, a copy of the post-conviction court's order is contained in
Addendum C. Petitioner timely appealed. R. 215.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Point I. Petitioner only challenges the dismissal of two of his claims: 1) that his
counsel misadvised him regarding the applicability of the official version of the offense in

5

the PSI; and 2) that his counsel refused to allow him to review the entire contents of his
plea affidavit. Assuming that petitioner's counsel in fact refiised to allow him to review
the plea affidavit petitioner knew of this claim at the time of the plea hearing. Therefore,
petitioner should have alleged this claim within the one-year limitations period governing
petitions for post-conviction relief. Petitioner did not file his petition, however, until
three years after the limitations period expired. Moreover, petitioner did not demonstrate
that the "interests of justice" should excuse his late filing. Therefore, the post-conviction
court correctly dismissed this claim as untimely.
As originally alleged, it appeared that petitioner's claim regarding the applicability
of the PSI's account of his crimes was also untimely because there was no dispute that
petitioner knew of this claim at sentencing. Based on this understanding, the postconviction court correctly dismissed this claim as untimely.
However, as clarified in petitioner's brief, die claim raises a factual dispute as to
when petitioner actually discovered it Given petitioner's pro se status and his recent
clarification of his claim, die State concedes that the Court should remand the case for
additional factual findings regarding when this claim actually accrued. Nevertheless, the
post-conviction court correctly dismissed petitioner's remaining claims as untimely.
Point II. The Court should not consider petitioner's constitutional challenge
because it is unpreserved and petitioner does not argue, let alone demonstrate that
exceptional circumstances exist or that plain error occurred.

6

Nor could petitioner establish either exception to the preservation rule. No
exceptional circumstances exist and any error would not have been obvious to the postconviction court because no court has declared unconstitutional the statute of limitations
in Utah's Post-Conviction Remedies Act.
Moreover, nor error occurred because the limitations period in the Act is
constitutional. Petitioner's federal constitutional challenge fails because the federal
Suspension Clause does not restrict state legislative action. The state Suspension Clause
is also inapplicable because the collateral relief afforded by Utah's Post-Conviction
Remedies Act is not equivalent to the traditional writ of habeas corpus. Even assuming
that the relief afforded in the Post-Conviction Remedies Act is equivalent to a writ of
habeas corpus, it is well-established that time limitations or other reasonable legislative
restrictions on habeas petitions do not violate the suspension clause.
ARGUMENT
I. THE POST-CONVICTION COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED
PETITIONER'S CLAIMS AS UNTIMELY; ALTHOUGH THE
CASE SHOULD BE REMANDED FOR ADDITIONAL FACTUAL
FINDINGS REGARDING PETITIONER'S CLAIM THAT HIS
COUNSEL ALLEGEDLY MISADVISED HIM REGARDING
THE APPLICABILITY OF THE PSFS ACCOUNT OF HIS
CRIMES
Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erroneously dismissed his
petition as untimely. Br. of Pet at 8-10. He contends that the "interests of justice"
excused his failure to file his petition timely because he did not discover his claims until
he received a copy of his attorney's file. Id. However, the post-conviction court correctly

7

found that all of the claims in the petition, as originally understood, were untimely and
that the interests of justice did not excuse petitioner's late filing. R. 217-20, Add. C.
Nevertheless, given petitioner's pro se status and the further clarification of his claim
alleging that his counsel misadvised him about the applicability of the PSFs account of
his crimes, the State concedes that there is a factual issue at least as to when this claim
accrued, and that additional factual findings are necessary.
The Post-Conviction Remedies Act imposes a one-year statute of limitations. See
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-35a-107 (1996). Petitioners have one yearfromthe accrual of

their cause of action within which to file a petition. See id. If a petitioner does not appeal
his conviction or sentence, his post-conviction claims accrue on 'the last day for filing an
appealfromthe entry of die final judgment of conviction." § 78-35a-107(2Xa). The Act
also incorporates a ''discovery rule" for claims that could not have reasonably been
discovered during the normal limitations period. It provides that a cause of action on
these previously undiscoverable claims does not accrue until "the date on which petitioner
knew or should have known, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, of evidentiary facts
on which the petition is based." § 78-35a-107(2)(e).
Although petitioner raised several claims in his petition, he challenges the
dismissal of only two. Br. of Pet. at 8-10. He contends the post-conviction court
erroneously dismissed his claims that: 1) his counsel misadvised him regarding the
applicability of the official version of the offense in the PSI; and 2) his counsel refused to
allow him to review the entire contents of his plea affidavit. Id. Because petitioner only
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challenges the dismissal of these two claims, he has waived any challenge to the dismissal
of the remaining claims in his petition. See Gildea v. Guardian Tide Co. of Utah, 2001
UT 75, U 10, 31 P.3d 543 (citing the well-settled principle that issues not raised in an
opening brief are waived and will not be considered by an appellate court).
A. The post-conviction court correctly held that petitioner's allegation
that his counsel refused to allow him to review the plea affidavit was
untimely and that the "interests of justice'9 did not excuse petitioner's
late filing.
The post-conviction court correctly dismissed as untimely petitioner's claim
alleging that his counsel refused to allow him to review the entire plea affidavit.
Petitioner's sentence was entered 4 March 1997 and he did not appeal. R. 171-73.
Therefore, the statute of limitations on his post-conviction claims began running on 3
April 1997 (the last day he could have filed a notice of appeal) and expired one year later
on 3 April 1998. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-35a-107(2)(a) (1996). Petitioner did not
file his petition until 17 April 2001. R. 218. Accordingly, the post-conviction court
correctly dismissed the petition as untimely.
Petitioner claims that the "interests of justice" should excuse his late filing because
he did not discover this claim until he received his counsel's file on 25 October 1999.2
2

Petitioner's argument that his claim was undiscoverable until he received his
attorney's file does not fit within the "interests of justice" exception. This exception does
not operate like a "discovery rule," which tolls the statute of limitations until a claim is
discovered. Rather, the Post-Conviction Remedies Act incorporates a "discovery rule" in
its statute of limitations. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-35a-107(2)(e). As discussed above,
a cause of action does not accrue under the Act until "the date on which petitioner knew
or should have known, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, of evidentiary facts on
which the petition is based." Id. Therefore, there is no need to apply the "interests of
justice" exception to claims that allegedly could not have been discovered during the
9

Br. of Pet at 7, 10-11. Petitioner's argument fails. Even if petitioner did not discover his
claim until 25 October 1999, his 17 April 2001 petition was still untimely. Moreover,
petitioner did not need to review his counsel's file to learn of this claim. Rather, he knew
or should have known of the facts supporting his claim at the time he entered his plea.
Assuming petitioner did not know of his claim until he received his counsel's file
on 25 October 1999, his petition would still be untimely. Petitioner had to file his petition
within one year of learning the evidentiary facts supporting his claim. See UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-35a-107(2)(e). Petitioner admits that he learned these facts, at the latest, on 25
October 1999. Br. of Pet. at 10-11. He therefore had until 25 October 2000 to file his
petition. His petition was not filed, however, until 17 April 2001 when he paid the filing
fee. R. 218, Add. C. Moreover, even if the petition was deemed "filed" on 25 January
2001 when it was received in the clerk's office without a filing fee, it was still three
months late.
In any event, petitioner did not need to review his attorney's file to discover the
factual basis of his claim. If petitioner's attorney refused to allow him to review the
entire contents of his plea affidavit at the plea hearing, petitioner clearly knew of the facts
supporting this claim at die time of his plea hearing. Consequently, petitioner could have
asserted this claim within die original one year limitations period

normal limitations period. To do so would render subsection (2)(e) mere surplusage. "In
analyzing a statute's plain language/' however, Utah courts "must attempt to give each
part of the provision a relevant and independent meaning so as to give effect to all of its
terms:' State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 66, J 34, 53 P.2d 1210.
10

Petitioner offers no other reason in his brief why the "interests of justice" should
have excused his late filing. He argued below that his ignorance of the opportunity to
seek post-conviction relief and his ignorance of the statute of limitations satisfied the
"interests of justice" exception. R. 219, Add. C. The post-conviction court correctly
rejected these claims, however. See, e.g., Godinski v. United States, 304 F.3d 761, 762
(7th Cir. 2002) ("Ignorance of the law does not justify an extension of the one-year
limitations period to commence a collateral attack"); People v. Vigil, 955 P.2d 589, 59192 (Colo. Ct. App. 1997) ("[Defendant's indigence, ignorance of the law, and lack of
legal assistance" did not excuse the latefilingof a collateral challenge to his conviction).
Accordingly, the post-conviction court correctly dismissed as untimely petitioner's claim
that his counsel refused to allow him to review his plea affidavit.
B. As originally pled, the post-conviction court also correctly dismissed
as untimely petitioner's claim that his counsel misadvised him
regarding the applicability of the PSI's account of his crimes;
nevertheless, given petitioner's additional clarification the State agrees
that this claim should be remanded for additional factual findings.
As originally pled, it appeared that petitioner was, or should have been aware at
sentencing of the facts supporting his claim that his counsel misadvised him regarding the
applicability of die PSFs account of his crimes. Petitioner originally pled in his pro se
petition that his counsel mislead him to believe that the State would admit that its version
of the allegations were wrong and would accept his version of the facts, and that the
official version of the offense in the PSI would not be considered by the sentencing court,
by Adult Probation and Parole in making their recommendation to the sentencing court,
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or by the Board of Pardons. R. 9, Add. B. Petitioner admitted, however, that he had read
through the PSI with his counsel prior to sentencing. R. 218, Add. C. Therefore, at
sentencing he would have been aware that the official version of the offense had some
weight with AP&P and with the sentencing court. As originally pled, it appeared that
petitioner knew of this claim at sentencing but failed to raise it timely.
Petitioner now clarifies in his brief that he only recently learned that the Board of
Pardons relies on the PSFs version of the offense, although his counsel had allegedly told
him otherwise. Br. of Pet at 9-10. This allegation was not clearfrompetitioner's
original petition, which heaped this claim together with other claims regarding the
sentencing court and AP&P. R. 9, Add- B. Nor did petitioner sufficiently clarify this
claim at the hearing on his petition.3 Indeed, in accordance with the State's original
interpretation of petitioner's claim, die post-conviction court found that petitioner knew
or should have known of the evidentiary facts supporting each of his claims at the time he
was sentenced. R. 218, Add. C.
Nevertheless, in hindsight, and with the additional clarification in petitioner's
brief, the State concedes that petitioner's pro se petition could be liberally construed to
allege that he had not, and could not have discovered this claim at sentencing. The State
concedes that as clarified in his brief, petitioner's allegation creates a factual issue as to
when this claim accrued. Therefore, given petitioner's additional clarification, and his
pro se status, the State concedes that this Court should remand the case for additional
3

Petitioner did not include a transcript of the hearing in the record on appeal.
Rather, he certified that the transcript was not necessary. R. 224.
12

factual findings as to when this claim accrued. If additional facts reveal that this claim is
untimely, the post-conviction court may dismiss the claim. If the claim is timely,
however, the post-conviction court can then consider its merits.4
II.

THE COURT SHOULD DECLINE TO CONSIDER
PETITIONER'S UNPRESERVED CONSTITUTIONAL
CHALLENGE; IN ANY EVENT THE STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS ON POST-CONVICTION PETITIONS IS
CONSTITUTIONAL

For the first time on appeal petitioner argues that the statute of limitations in the
Post-Conviction Remedies Act is unconstitutional. Br. of Pet. at 11-14. This Court
should decline to consider this unpreserved claim, however, because petitioner does not
argue that any exception to the preservation rule applies. Alternatively, petitioner has not
and cannot demonstrate that the statute of limitations is plainly unconstitutional.
A. The Court should decline to review petitioner's unpreserved claim
because he does not argue that any exception to the preservation
rule applies.
"As a general rule, claims not raised before the trial court may not be raised on
appeal." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f 11, 10 P.3d 346 (citing State v. Marvin, 964
P.2d 313, 318 (Utah 1998)). "[T]he preservation rule applies to every claim, including
constitutional questions." Id (citing Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d 1017, 1022 (Utah
1996)). Petitioner did not raise this claim below; therefore, it is unpreserved. See id.
Petitioner can raise an unpreserved issue on appeal if he demonstrates that plain
error occurred or that exceptional circumstances exist. Holgate, 2000 UT 74 at f 11
4

The State does not concede, however, that petitioner would be able to establish
that his claim was timely or meritorious.
f3

(citing Monson, 928 P.2d at 1022). Petitioner fails to argue, let alone demonstrate, that
either exception to the preservation rule applies. Consequently, this Court should decline
to review petitioner's unpreserved claim. See State v. Calliham, 2002 UT 86, f 71,455
Utah Adv. Rep. 25 (declining to review an unpreserved claim where the party failed to
argue plain error or exceptional circumstances); State v. Cramer, 2002 UT 9, f 33,44
P.3d 609 (same); State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226,1229 n.5 (Utah 1995) (same).
B. Petitioner cannot demonstrate that exceptional circumstances exist
or that plain error occurred.
Even if this Court were to review petitioner's claim under the plain error or
exceptional circumstances exceptions the claim would nevertheless fail. Exceptional
circumstances arise only when "rare procedural anomalies" occur. See Holgate, 2000 UT
74 at f 12. There were no such "procedural anomalies" in the proceedings below.
Nor could petitioner demonstrate that plain error occurred. To do so he would
have to show: "(i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial
court; and (iii) the error is harmful. See State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah
1993). Even assuming that the post-conviction court erred, petitioner could not
demonstrate that the error "should have been obvious." See id. An error is not obvious
where there is no settled law on the issue. See State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781, 786 (Utah
1992) (relying on the "clarity of the law in this area" to find that the error should have
been obvious); State v. Frausto, 2002 UT App 259, \ 12, 53 P.3d 486 ('"To show
obviousness of the error [Defendant] must show that the law was clear at the time of
trial/") (quoting State v. Garcia, 2001 UT App 19, U 6, 18 P.3d 1123) (alteration in
14

original). As this Court observed in Swart v. State, 1999 UT App 96, f 4, 976 P.2d 100,
"no court has yet actually declared the statute of limitations set forth in section 78-3 5a107 unconstitutional." Furthermore, unlike the post-conviction court in Swart, the postconviction court here considered the "interests of justice" exception, but found that
petitioner had not carried his burden to demonstrate why the exception should apply. R.
217-20, Add. C. Consequently, petitioner's plain error claim would fail becatise any error
could not have been obvious to the post-conviction court.
In any event, the post-conviction court did not err because the statute of limitations
is constitutional. Petitioner claims the statute of limitations violates the Suspension
Clause of both the federal and state constitutions. Br. of Pet. at 11-14. His claim fails for
three reasons: 1) the federal Suspension Clause is inapplicable because it restricts only
federal congressional action, not that of state legislatures; 2) the state Suspension Clause
is also inapplicable because an action under Utah's Post-Conviction Remedies Act is not
equivalent to a petition for writ of habeas corpus; and 3) even if the writ of habeas corpus
has expanded to include collateral post-conviction relief, reasonable legislative
restrictions on the availability of that relief do no amount to an unconstitutional
"suspension" of the writ of habeas corpus.
The federal Suspension Clause is inapplicable because it restricts only federal
congressional action. It is found in Article I of the United States Constitution, which
creates and enumerates the powers of the federal congress. U.S. CONST, art. 1, § 9. It
places no restrictions on the power of state legislatures to "suspend" the privilege of the
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state writ of habeas corpus. See id. Indeed, even as early as 1917 the Unites States
Supreme Court recognized that "Section 9 of Article 1, as has long been settled, is not
restrictive of state, but only of national, action." Gasquet v. Lapeyre, 242 U.S. 367, 369
(1917). See also, Flannigan v. State, 3 P.3d 372, 374 (Alaska 2000) (holding that the
federal Suspension Clause does not limit state regulation of habeas corpus).
The state Suspension Clause is equally inapplicable because a petition under
Utah's Post-Conviction Remedies Act is not equivalent to a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus. "The writ of habeas corpus known to the Framers was quit different from that
which exists today." Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 663 (1996). Historically, a writ of
habeas corpus could not be used to challenge the constitutionality of a conviction. For
example, in Ex Parte Watkins, 28 U.S. 193,202-Q3 (1830), the United States Supreme
Court held that a federal court's evaluation of a post-conviction writ of habeas corpus was
limited to determining whether die court: of conviction had subject matter jurisdiction. "A
judgment, in its nature concludes the subject on which it is rendered, and pronounces the
law of the case. The judgment of a court of record whose jurisdiction is final, is as
conclusive on all the world as the judgment of this Court would be

It puts an end to

inquiry concerning the fact, by deciding it." Id. After reviewing the English common
law which informed its understanding of the scope of the writ, the Court explained that
"[t]he judgment of the circuit court in a criminal case is of itself evidence of its own
legality," and the Court could not "usurp that power by the instrumentality of the writ of
habeas corpus." Id. at 207. As one commentator explained, "[t]he writ was simply not
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available at all to one convicted of a crime by a court of competent jurisdiction." Paul M.
Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76
Harv. L. Rev. 441, 446 (1963).
In contrast, Utah's Post-Conviction Remedies Act expands upon the narrow
avenue of relief provided by the traditional writ of habeas corpus. Utah's Act allows a
defendant to collaterally challenge the constitutionality of his conviction or sentence and
to raise claims based on newly discovered evidence. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3 5a104(1) (1996). Therefore, a petition under Utah's Act is more akin to the common law
writ of error coram nobis not habeas corpus.5 See State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 36, 38 (Utah
1981) ("The postconviction hearing procedure is a successor to the common-law writ of
error coram nobis"). Consequently, the Suspension Clause in the Utah Constitution is
inapplicable because it only restricts the legislature's ability to suspend the "privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus."

UTAH CONST,

art. I, § 5.

The United States Supreme Court has recognized that the scope of the federal writ
of habeas corpus now includes post-conviction collateral review similar to that permitted
by Utah's Post-Conviction Remedies Act. See, e.g., Felker, 518 U.S. at 663. For
example, in Felker, the Court briefly surveyed the history of habeas review and
recognized that its own decisions eventually interpreted the federal statute authorizing
habeas review "to allow a final judgment of conviction in a state court to be collaterally
5

A writ of error coram nobis 6Svas used by a sentencing court to modify or vacate
a judgment of conviction on the basis of facts which, without defendant's fault, did not
appear on the face of the record and as to which defendant was without other remedy."
State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 36, 38 (Utah 1981).
17

attacked on habeas." Id. Even if a petition under Utah's Post-Conviction Remedies \ct
were equivalent to a petition for writ of habeas corpus, however, the statute of limitations
would not violate the Suspension Clause of the Utah Constitution.
Utah's Suspension Clause provides: "The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
shall not be suspended, unless, in case of rebellion or invasion, the public safety requires
it." UTAH CONST, art. I, § 5. This clause "is essentially identical" to the federal
Suspension Clause. Hurst v. Cook, 111 P.2d 1029, 1033 (Utah 1989). See also Currier v.
Holden, 862 P.2d 1357, 1365 (Utah App. 1993) (citing Hurst and noting that art. I, § 5
"essentially parallels" its federal counterpart). Therefore, Utah courts may look to federal
precedents for guidance in interpreting Utah's Suspension Clause. See Sandy City v.
Larson, 733 P.2d 137, 138 (Utah 1987) (holding that U.S. Supreme Court cases
interpreting federal self-incrimination provision provide guidance in interpreting its Utah
counter-part). Federal precedents make it absolutely clear that statutes of limitation, or
other reasonable statutory restrictions on the availability of the writ do not amount to an
unconstitutional "suspension" of die writ of habeas corpus.
It is well-settled that die legislature may restrict the scope of the writ of habeas
corpus. As die United States Supreme Court stated in Felker, i4we have long recognized
that 4the power to award die writ by any of the courts of the United States, must be given
by written law."' 518 U.S. at 664 (quoting Ex Parte Bollman, 4 Cranch 75, 94, 2 L. Ed.
554 (1807)). Likewise the Court has "recognized that judgments about die proper scope
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of the writ are 'normally for Congress to make.'" Id. (quoting Lonchar v. Thomas, 517
U.S. 314, 323 (1996)).
Because Congress is responsible to determine the proper scope of the writ, federal
courts have unanimously upheld the federal statute of limitations on the filing of a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Like the Utah Post-Conviction Remedies Act, the act
governing federal habeas relief for state prisoners includes a one-year limitations period.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Numerous federal courts have addressed the issue of
whether this limitations period amounts to an unconstitutional "suspension" of the writ of
habeas corpus. "Every court which has addressed the issue - i.e., whether, as a general
matter, § 2244(d) constitutes an unconstitutional suspension of the writ - has concluded
that it does not" Wyzykowski v. Dept. of Corrections, 226 F.3d 1213, 1217 (11th Cir.
2000); see also, Miller v. Marr, 141 F.3d 976, 978 (10th Cir.), cert, denied, 525 U.S. 891
(1998). As the United States Supreme Court recently held, the vehicles available to a
defendant for challenging die constitutionality of his conviction "are not available
indefinitely and without limitation." Daniels v. United States, 532 U.S. 374, 381 (2001).
Rather, the Court observed that i4[p]rocedural barriers, such as statutes of limitations and
rules concerning procedural default and exhaustion of remedies, operate to limit access to
review on the merits of a constitutional claim." Id. (citing United States v. Olano, 507
U.S. 725, 731 (1993)).
Likewise, state courts have held that although a writ of habeas corpus may not be
suspended or abrogated by legislative action, a legislature may regulate the procedure
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with respect to habeas corpus. See Jordan v. Housewright, 696 P.2d 998 (Nev. 1985),
Maryland House of Correction v. Fields, 703 A.2d 167 (Md. 1997); Ex parte Davis, 947
S.W. 2d 216 (Tex. Crim App. 1996). Thus, even if Utah's Post-Conviction Remedies Act
is viewed as an extension of rights under the common law writ of habeas corpus, the
legislature may enact a statute of limitations governing relief under the Act. See Felker,
518 U.S. at 664; Daniels, 532 U.S. at 381. Accordingly, like its federal counterpart, the
statute of limitations in Utah's Post-Conviction Remedies Act is not an unconstitutional
"suspension" of the writ of habeas corpus.
CONCLUSION
The statute of limitations governing post-conviction petitions is constitutional and
the post-conviction court correctly dismissed the petition as untimely, with die exception
of petitioner's claim alleging that his attorney misinformed him about die applicability of
the PSF account of his crimes. Given the clarification in petitioner's brief, the State
agrees that this claim should be remanded for additional factual findings regarding when
it actually accrued. The Court should affirm, however, the dismissal of petitioner's
remaining claims.
Respectfully submitted this ^ f " day of November 2002.
MARKL.SHURTLEFF
Attorney General

CHRISTOPHER D. BALLARD
Assistant Attorney General
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Addenda

Addendum A

Addendum A

The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases
of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.
U.S. CONST, art I, § 9.

The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless, in case of
rebellion or invasion, the public safety requires it.
UTAH CONST, art. I, § 5.

(1) A petitioner is entitled to relief only if the petition is filed within one year after the
cause of action has accrued.
(2) For purposes of this section, the cause of action accrues on the latest of the following
dates:
(a) the last day for filing an appealfromthe entry of the final judgment of
conviction, if no appeal is taken;
(b) the entry of the decision of the appellate court which has jurisdiction over the
case, if an appeal is taken;
(c) the last day for filing a petition for writ of certiorari in the Utah Supreme Court
or the United States Supreme Court, if no petition for writ of certiorari is filed;
(d) the entry of the denial of the petition for writ of certiorari or the entry of the
decision on the petition for certiorari review, if a petition for writ of certiorari is
filed; or
(e) the date on which petitioner knew or should have known, in the exercise of
reasonable diligence, of evidentiary facts on which the petition is based.
(3) If the court finds that the interests of justice require, a court may excuse a petitioner's
failure to file within the time limitations.
(4) Sections 78-12-35 and 78-12-40 do not extend the limitations period established in
this section.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-35a-107 (1996).

Addendum B

Addendum R

SJakt-

\Z>o<lr A

(naste)

Attorney Pro Se
•?.rt &«^2.gtf
faddress^
tw»*r; UT
faddress^

JUDICIAL DISTRICT

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

COUNTY

Utlt

J. Sfti^

petitioner,

vs.

»
*
«
»
*
*

FETITICN FOR RELIEF UNDER
THE FCST-CONVICTION REMEDI:
ACT
UCA §78-2£a-lCl.e- sec.
URCF Rule 6zC
Case No.

*

f|«nW Cf^*

I.

Respondent.

*

NAME OF RESPONDENT:
Conviction of Felonv:
X.
y'Conviction cf Misdemeanor:
Conviction of Misdemeanor:

II.

Judce

State of Utah
County of: 4 * ^ Uc>-C
Municipality cf: ^*A^l^«,

IDENTIFICATION OF CURRENT AND RELATED CASES

1(a),
challenged:
(b).
(c).

Name of court that entered the judgment
TK+t Jg^i ^Jwlg coorV
Location cf Court: HSo *.. *4»U *. Sue
Case number:_2felfl^LL3fa

Date of judgment being challenged: A \ P ^ K M

being

iq^7

PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

5.

What was your plea?
Not guilty
y Guilty
No contest
Guilty and Mentally ill
Not guilty by reason of insanity

6.
If you entered a plea of guilty to sone counts, and a not
a
guilty pie to ether counts, give your plea to each count:

7.
If you pled not guilty or net guilty by reason of
insanity, was 'the trial before?
Jury
8.

Did you testify at the trial?
Yes

5.

Judge

Y

No

Did ycu appeal front the conviction or sentence?
Yes

10. If
information:
A.

your

X

No

answer

is

"yes"

provide

the

following

Name of Appellate Court:.
Case Number:_„
Result:
Effective

1/96

a

PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

Date of result or citation of opinion:.
Grounds raised:

Cid ycu seek further review cf this appeal?
Yes

If
information:

11.

why not?

ycur

answer

Nc

is

,!

yes,f

crevice

the

(1)
(2)
(2;

Name cf Reviewing Ccurt:.
Case number:
Result:

(4;
(5)

Date cf result or citation of cpinicn:.
Grounds raised:

fcilcwinc

If you did not appeal from your conviction or sentence,

I L L U ^ AWi'x QHIAXV W ^

IT

\*. so d ^

**

^^A

12(a). Other than your direct appeal from your conviction or
sentence, have you filed any petitions, applications, or motions
with respect to this conviction or sentence in any court, state or
federal?
Effective 7/96

PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

^Yes
(b).
information:
(1)
(2)
(3;
(4)
(5)

A

No

If your answer is "yes", provide the following

Name of court:.
Case Number:
Result:.
Date cf result citation of opinion:
Grounds Raised:

(c) Did you receive an evidentiary hearing en ycur petition,
application, or mcrion?
Yes

No

(d) Did you appeal the decision en ycur petition, application
or motion?
Yes
(e) If
information:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

your

No
answer

is

"yes,11

provide

the

following

Name of court:
Case Number:
Result:,
Date of result citation of opinion:
Grounds Raised:

Effective 7/96

4

PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

13(a).
Other than the case described in question 12, have
you filed any further petitions, applications, or notions with
respect to this conviction or sentence in any court, state or
federal?
Yes
_ £ _ No
(b) If
information:

your

answer

is

"yes,"

provide

the

following

(1) Name cf court:.
(2) Case Number:
(I)

Result:

(4) Date cf result citation cr cpinicn:.
(5) Grounds Raised:

(c) Did you receive an evidentiary hearing en ycur petition,
application, or metier*?
Yes

No

(d) Did you appeal the decision en ycur petition, application
or motion?
Yes
(e) If
information:
(1)
(2)
(3;
(4)
(5)

your

No
answer

is

"yes,"

provide

the

following

Name cf court:
Case Number:_
Result:.
Date cf result citation of opinion:.
Grounds Raised:

Effective 7/96

PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

14(a) Do you have any petition, appeal, cr motion now pending
in any court, "state or federal, relating tc the judgnent being
challenged:
y

(b) If
information:

III.

Yes

your

No

answer

is

"yes,"

provide

the

following

3 r * J*i,c>* ^ U ^ V to*r\r

(1)

Name cf c a u r t :

(2)

Case timber:

(3)

Nature cf proceeding: ,n«*»^ W fafrttN^ »fr s^^irC

*L\lo\*6\f±

\

Grounds Fcr Relief

NOTICE TO THE PETITIONER: You may be barred frcm presenting
additional grounds in a future post-conviction petition if you fail
to present any grounds that you could present here but do net.
The following is a list cf the most frequently raised grounds
for relief in Post-Conviction proceedings. Each statement preceded
by a letter constitutes a separate ground for possible relief. You
should raise in this petition any of these grounds that apply and
any other grounds net*listed that you may have available.
DO NOT MERELY CHECK THE GROUNDS LISTED. If you believe any of
these grounds apply to you. You must allege facts. The petition
will be returned" to you" if you merely check a ground and fail to
list necessary facts"or attach supporting documentation.
(a) Conviction obtained by plea of guilty that was unlawfully
induced or net made voluntarily with understanding of the nature of
the charge and the consequences of the plea.
(b)

Conviction obtained by use cf coerced confession.
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Effective 7/96

PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

(c) Convicticn obtained by use of evidence gained pursuant to
an unconstitutional search and seizure.
(d) Conviction obtained by use of evidence obtained pursuant
to an unlawful arrest.
(e) Conviction obtained
against self-incrimination.

by a violation of the

privilege

(f) Conviction obtained by the unconstitutional failure of
the prosecution tc disclcse to the defendant evidence favorable to
che defendant.
(c) Convicticn obtained
against double jeopardy.

by a viclaticr. cf the prelection

(h) Conviction obtained by action of a grand cr petit jury
that was unconstitutionally selected and impaneled.
(i)

Denial cf effective assistance of counsel.

(j) Convicticn
under
an
unconstitutional
constitutionally protected conduct.
(k)

statute

or

Denial of right tc appeal.

State concisely every ground on which you claim you are
entitled to post-conviction relief. Summarize* briefly the facts
supporting each ground. If necessary, you may attach* additional
pages stating additional grounds and facts supporting same.
(a)

GROUND ONE: 1 W . I

of effo^u, ***:*X+«,.* *£ t*u«.<>*[

Supporting Facts fcr Ground One (state briefly without citing
law or making argument):
/^^VfcvJrv

<A

7

Effective

7/96

i *~) ^?/ouv\<A
1 V ^ ^

Q\r\e^
£>4 g f i f c c - k W *<£. ^ * c ^ ( .

>•

r

- 4 v a ^ (tru *t*n/**,>) •

ik.

5 \ ^ ^ ^ ^/wv^- 4^^, ;oe.fc*- wg^ Ciavs^ <^ \P o J ^
_^_

^.rr c

v^v^

--

6,

T),fcA>;

Qx

C

fi ' W A ,

4_ai

^

**fty

3^

&±4

<«sc

r.

\ vJo

\ y<.
2 - rr
Wdc^

^>y^^cdv-

."></^

(7

C M * . (;J,«o> / t ^ « ^ * W A y

4Ww<_

LS

>"0 - A - jr

;«n<^ C a ^ l f e s ^ Vg V*.

(

\^J4i^SfcL X

i^oOA

V\i»u^ U^fJC

-T^^A

^

' < ^ ^

^

O^s ^ W ^ . i

(V- '

u3> yO^\A &*

'-g : ^ a '

^Jw^e\

^^gy^^rA

AW

t,/w

>ftv^f^—fflz

a-V

'

A / ^ C

* ^ £ g c A ^ £ ^ s * , ^ •**«*€£.

/J/^^W^

^

(oJ^tv

A^n^/A^Cv- >^N

/a

PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

(h)

GROUND TWO; OfAj/aI

ofeffkc/>>g

/iSf.'sr+„ee

of

COCUJ

Supporting Facts for Ground Two ( s t a t s b r i e f i y without c i t i n g
law or makina arcucent):

(^At^^tS\

(c)

GROUND THRK-:

I ai^J^\\

Supporting Facts for Ground Three (state briefly without
citing law or making argument):

Effective 7/96

PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

(c) GROUND FOUR:
Supporting Facts for Ground Four (state briefly wirhour citing
law or making argument):

16. If any cf the grounds lisred above were ncr previously
presented in any orher courr, srare or federal, srate briefly which
crounds were not uresented and your reasons for nor presenting
then.
"

17. Give the name and address, if known, of each attorney who
presented ycu in the following stages of the judgment being
challenged:
(a) Preliminary hearing: *kku
(b) Arraignment and Plea:
^ " "J
(c)
(d)
(e)

Trial:
Sentencing:
Aooeal:

fa^V^

A
HW* $*>*> tfn
£JH-«ACLJA/
5

JL(&
u

^ "r cruu>
*^,M

Effective 7/96

/S

PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

(f)~ Post-conviction proceeding:
(g) Appeal from post-conviction proceeding:.
18(a) Do you have any future sentence to serve after you
complete the sentence imposed by the judgment being challenged?
>/ No

Yes
(b)
information:
(1)
(2)
(2)

If

your

answer

is

"yes,11

give

the

following

Name cf Court:
Location:.
Case Number:,

IV. REQUIRED ATTACHMENTS
NOTICE TO THE PETITIONER: If you do not attach the required
copies or provide an explanation cf why you cannot provide them.
This petition will not be filed and will be returned to you. You
may then lose your right to file a petition if the statute cf
limitations expires before you file another petiticn.
19. Attach a copy of the following documents to this petition
or provide an explanation why you cannot provide the copies.
(a) The judgment and commitment being challenged.
(b) Any decision issued by an appellate court from the direct
appeal.
(c) Any previously-filed petition for post-conviction relief,
and any decision issued* as a result.
(d) Affidavits, records, or other documentary evidence that
support your claim.
(e) An affidavit of impecunicsity and certificate from the
Inmate Accounting Office, if you are requesting waiver of the
filing fee.
(f) Memorandum of Points and Authorities^
V. PETITIONER'S VERIFICATION UNDER OATH
STATE OF UTAH

)
10

Effective 7/96

PETITION FOR POST

-CONVICTION RELIS*

:ss
COUNTY OF h\s(/
)
I the undersigned petitioner, declare under penalty cf perjury
that the information I have provided in this petition is true and
correct.
Sicr.atura^jof Petitioner
SUBSCRIBED

X5D SWRtf to before r.e en this

Z3>

cay cf

N6TAR¥rtltUC
JANENE H. HUANO
MyCOIfWIlMlQftcXplNS

STATE OF UTAH 1
VI. CERTIFICATION CF ATTORNEY (If petitioner is represented
by attorney)•
I certify I am the attorney for petitioner, and tha- zhis petition
copies with Rule 11 (UT:ah "Rules of Civil Procedure).
Signature of Attorney
Name of petitioner:
Address

f-ective //'
Efis
11
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Addendum C

NLEDDlS7^AT^ri8nT
Third JUJCW uistnct

JUM - 3
CHRISTOPHER D. BALLARD (8497)
Assistant Attorney General
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666)
Utah Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
Telephone: (801) 366-0180

* * +

Deputy Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DALE J. BAIRD,
Petitioner,

v.

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW AND ORDER DISMISSING PETITION
FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
Case No. 010900810

HANKGALETKA,
Judge Tyrone E. Medley
Respondent.

This matter came before the Court 11 April 2002 for a hearing on petitioner's petition for
post-conviction relief. Petitioner was present and appeared pro se; Respondent appeared through
counsel, Assistant Attorney General Christopher D. Ballard. The Court has reviewed the
petition, the State's response, and petitioner's reply. The Court also heard argument on the
petition at the hearing. Now being folly advised in the premises, the Court enters the following
findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order dismissing the petition with prejudice:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1. On 6 January 1997 petitioner pled guilty to one count each of sexual abuse of a child,
a second degree felony, dealing in harmful material to a minor, a third degree felony, and supply
of alcohol to a minor, a class A misdemeanor.
2. Petitioner was sentenced on 3 March 1997.
3. Petitioner did not appeal his criminal conviction or sentence. The last day he could
have filed a notice of appeal was 2 April 1997.
4. Petitioner filed his post-conviction petition on 17 April 2001.
5. Although petitioner claims that he did not realize the full extent of his counsel's
alleged ineffectiveness until he received a copy of his counsel's file, petitioner knew, or should
have known of the evidentiary facts supporting each of his claims at the time petitioner was
sentenced.
6. Petitioner did not even request that his attorney provide him with information from his
file until 11 May 1998.
7. At the hearing on his petition petitioner admitted that he reviewed the pre-sentence
investigation report with his counsel prior to sentencing.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Petitioner's cause of action accrued on 2 April 1997—the last day he could have filed
a notice of appeal—and expired one year later on 2 April 1998. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-35a107(2).
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2. Because petitioner did not file his petition until 17 April 2001, the petition is untimely.
See id.
3. Interpretation of the Post-Conviction Remedies Act as a whole demonstrates that the
"interests of justice" exception to the statute of limitations was meant to apply under only truly
exceptional circumstances. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-35al07(3).
4. Petitioner's ignorance of the opportunity to seek post-conviction relief does not excuse
his failure to file his petition timely, nor do the interests of justice excuse the untimeliness of his
petition on this ground.
5. Petitioner's ignorance of the statute of limitations likewise does not excuse his failure
to file his petitioner timely, nor do the interests of justice excuse the untimeliness of his petition
on this ground.
6. Petitioner has not alleged or demonstrated any additional reason that the interests of
justice should excuse his failure to file his petition timely.
7. Therefore, the interests of justice do not excuse petitioner's failure to file within the
time limitations*
8. Petitioner is entitled to appeal this order. If he wishes to do so, he must file a timely
notice of appeal. Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires that "the notice of
appeal... shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 30 days after the date of entry of
the judgment or order appealed from. Utah R. App. P. 4.
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ORDER
Based upon the foregoing findings and conclusions IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
The petition for post-convictianyelief is DISMISSED with prejudice.
DATED this ^

day of

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Dale J. Baird
ProSe
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on 22 April 2002,, I mailed, postage prepaid a correct copy of the
foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER DISMISSING
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF to:
Dale J. Baird, #26105
Utah State Prison
P.O. Box 250
Draper, UT 84020

^st^sC&CJ7
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